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LEGALITY OF PURCHASE BY A CORPORATION
OF ITS OWN STOCK.
Taking the decisions as a whole, English and American,
on the subject of the legality of a purchase by a corporation
of its own stock, they are in a deplorable condition of con-
flict and confusion, though a close analysis will show that to
a considerable extent the conflict is more apparent than real.
Such conflict and confusion are revealed in the results
reached by text-writers on the law of corporations. As I
shall presently endeavor to show, the doctrine that a pur-
chase by a corporation of its own stock is inherently illegal,
appears on analysis of the decisions to have scarcely any
support in this country. Yet this doctrine seems sanctioned
in 2 "Thompson on Corporations," §2054; 7 Id. §8352; I
"Morawetz on Corporations," 2d ed., §§ 112, 434; I "Spell-
ing on Corporations," §I68; "Clark on Corporations," p.
153. On the other hand, the doctrine almost universally
prevailing in this country, that such a purchase is legal in the
absence of circumstances producing special injury, is more
or less clearly sanctioned in "Taylor on Corporations," 4th
ed., § 35; "Elliott on Corporations," 3d ed., § 193; 7 "Am.
and Eng. Enc. of Law," 2d ed., p. 818. Which of these
doctrines is sanctioned in "Cook on Corporations" seems
not entirely clear. See Vol. I, §§311, 312.
As such conflict and confusion seem to have somewhat
resulted from a failure to clearly apprehend the precise
nature of the comparatively simple phenomena involved in
such a purchase, it seems desirable to reach such clear appre-
hension before proceeding to a consideration of the decisions
in detail.
A stock corporation consists of a number of stockholders
or individuals who, instead of holding and managing certain
property separately, hold and manage it in common. For
present purposes it seems unnecessary to consider the dis-
tinction between a corporation and a partnership. The in-
terest of each stockholder, that is his stock, consists in a
proportionate undivided share of the property so held and
managed in common.
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To take the simplest instance first, let us consider the
effect of a surrender or gift by a stockholder of his stock
or interest to the corporation. Speaking generally, the
property held and managed in common, that is the property
of the corporation, is neither increased nor diminished by
such surrender or gift. The stockholder surrendering or
giving his stock ordinarily suffers loss in that he surrenders
or gives something for nothing. But ordinarily no one else
suffers loss. Indeed, each of the other stockholders is bene-
fited in that his proportionate undivided share of the prop-
erty held and managed in common is increased. And (save
under certain conditions, as to liability on unpaid subscrip-
tions) whether the corporation be solvent or insolvent, the
creditors suffer no loss, the property of the corporation not
being diminished.
In considering the effect of a sale by a stockholder of his
stock or interest to the corporation, a specific illustration
will aid. Suppose the corporate property to be of the value
of $300,ooo, there being three stockholders whose interests
are equal, that is, of the value of $ioo,ooo each. Suppose
now one of such stockholders to sell his stock or interest to
the corporation for $5o,ooo. He suffers loss to the extent
of $5o,ooo in that he surrenders for $5o,ooo property worth
$ioo,ooo. But, while the corporate property as a whole is
diminished to the extent of $50,000, the individual interests
of the other two stockholders are not. That is, the stock or
interest of each of these two becomes worth $125,000 instead
of $ioo,ooo. But if the sale be for $15o,ooo instead of
$50,000, it is obvious that the selling stockholder is benefited
to the extent of $5o,ooo. And not only is the corporate
property as a whole diminished to the extent of $I5O,OOO,
but the other stockholders suffer loss in that the stock or
interest of each becomes worth only $75,000 instead of
$ioo,ooo. It follows then that, in case of a sale by a stock-
holder of his stock or interest to the corporation, the cor-
porate property as a whole is necessarily diminished, but it
will depend entirely on the conditions of the sale, whether
the sale produces benefit or loss to the stockholders that
remain, or to the selling stockholder. It is insisted how-
ever in I "Morawetz on Corporations," 2d ed., §112, that
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the necessary result is injury to "every continuing stock-
holder." See, however, article by E. C. Moore, Jr., in 8
"Southern Law Review," 369, 381 (1882).
Continuing the use of our illustration, let us consider
whether injury is produced to creditors of the corporation.
Of course, speaking generally, no benefit is produced to
them. If the corporation is in a prosperous condition,
deriving large profits from its business, and having debts
that are few and insignificant, the injury to creditors is
remote and contingent. But if it is in a failing condition,
with say $5oo,ooo of liabilities, it is obvious that injury is
produced to creditors, in that property available for the
satisfaction of their claims is reduced from $300,000 to
$250,000 or $15oooo, as the case may be.
A consideration of these illustrations would seem to point
to the conclusion that, whether a purchase by a corporation
of its own stock produces injury to the corporation, or, to
speak more accurately, to those that continue to be stock-
holders, depends on the conditions of the sale; whether it
produces injury to creditors depends on the financial con-
dition of the corporation.
In this view, whenever the question of the legality of such
a purchase is raised, it would seem important to determine
whether it is raised on behalf of the corporation or continu-
ing stockholders, or on behalf of creditors. And it would
seem a logical view that the purchase will be held legal or
illegal, according as it appears whether injury has resulted
to the corporation or continuing stockholders, or to the
creditors, as the case may be. Compare article in 8 "South-
ern Law Review," supra.
Indeed, as will presently be seen, there is observable in the
decisions, particularly the American decisions, a strong ten-
dency toward the establishment of a doctrine as thus just
stated. But such decisions also reveal a wide range of doc-
trine, from on the one hand the broad doctrine that such a
purchase is inherently illegal, and, perhaps, without refer-
ence to circumstances, to the other broad doctrine that it is
legal, save under circumstances of special injury.
The subject will here be considered under the following
subdivisions:
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I. PURCHASE AS INHERENTLY ILLEGAL.
II. ILLEGALITY OF PURCHASE AS CONSTITUTING
TRANSACTION STRICTLY ULTRA VIRES, THAT IS, BEYOND
AUTHORIZED PURPOSES OF CORPORATION.
III. ILLEGALITY OF PURCHASE AS CONSTITUTING UN-
AUTHORIZED REDUCTION OF CAPITAL.
IV. PURCHASE AS LEGAL IN THE ABSENCE OF CIR-
CUMSTANCES PRODUCING SPECIAL INJURY.
V. PURCHASE AS LEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES
PRODUCING SPECIAL BENEFIT.
VI. PURCHASE AS ILLEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUM-
STANCES PRODUCING SPECIAL INJURY TO THE CORPORA-
TION OR CONTINUING STOCKHOLDERS.
VII. PURCHASE AS ILLEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUM-
STANCES PRODUCING SPECIAL INJURY TO EXISTING CREDI-
TORS OF THE CORPORATION.
VIII. LEGALITY OF PURCHASE AS AFFECTED BY CHAR-
ACTER OF CORPORATION.
IX. RIGHT TO RELIEF AGAINST PURCHASE AS
!AFFECTED BY DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXECUTORY 'AND
EXECUTED TRANSACTION.
X. SUMMARY.
I.
PURCHASE AS INHERENTLY ILLEGAL.
The English cases in particular seem to have been some-
times regarded as authority for the broad proposition that
such a purchase is inherently illegal, even without reference
to circumstances. There may be decisions professedly rest-
ing on that ground, but probably there is none the circum-
stances of which necessarily required the application of such
a doctrine. For though in any given case the circumstances
of that case may have been regarded as insufficient to pre-
vent the purchase from being illegal, it does not necessarily
follow that a distinct set of circumstances would be likewise
insufficient.
The leading English decision of Trevor v. Whitworth, 12
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L. R. App. Cas. 409 (1887) decided by the House of Lords,
seems however to go very far in the direction of upholding
the broad propositionthat such apurchase is inherently illegal
without reference to circumstances. There, ontheliquidation
of a manufacturing corporation, a claim for the purchase price
of its own stock agreed to be purchased by it was held unen-
forcible. The decision is not at all based on the financial
condition of the corporation, though in one of the opinions
it was incidentally stated (p. 432) that this and other pur-
chases were made, "although the company was steadily
going from bad to worse, trading at a loss, and at the same
time borrowing money to buy up the shares of members who
wanted to withdraw," also (p. 434) that "the creditors are
unpaid." It may be that on the facts the decision is sustain-
able on the sole ground of the existence of circumstances
producing special injury to creditors. Nor was the effect
of the purchase as producing injury to the corporation or
the continuing stockholders discussed, and it seems not en-
tirely clear what, if any, such circumstances were. The
purchase was at par value, but what the market value was
does not appear, though in one of the opinions the agreed
price was characterized as not being "the market value or
as bearing any relation to the market value" (p. 432). It
was regarded as insufficient to justify the purchase, that the
object was to keep the corporation "as a sort of family con-
cern," and become rid of undesirable stockholders. See pp.
417, 430, 434. See comments on this decision in 2 Ry. &
Corp. L. 1. 169 (1887). See also as to the doctrine as rec-
ognized in England. Teasdale's Case, 9 L. R. Ch. App. 54
(1873) (and comments thereon in Trevor v. Whitworth,
supra, and Hope v. International Financial Soc., infra) ;
Walter's Case, 3 DeGex & Sm. 244 (1850); Ex parte
Morgan, i Macn & G. 225 (1849); Cross' Case, 38 L. J.
Ch. 583 (1869). Compare Bennett's Case, 5 DeGex, M.
& G. 284 (1854).
On a close analysis it will be found that, whatever may be
certain language used in opinions, in few if any of the
United States has been established the extreme English doc-
trine that such a purchase is inherently illegal. As a rule
the legality of such a purchase rests in this country on
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special circumstances of injury to stockholders or creditors.
The decisions in Ohio and Kansas seem to go as far as any
in recognizing the English doctrine.
In Coppin v. Greenlees & Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St. 275
(1882) where an agreement by a manufacturing corporation
to purchase its own stock was held unenforcible, the court
said: "We think the decided weight of authority both in
England and in the United States, is against the existence
of the power, unless conferred by express grant or clear
implication." See also State, ex rel. v. Oberlin Building &
Loan Assoc., 35 Ohio St. 258, 263 (1879); Hubbard v.
Riley, 3 Cinn. L. Bull. 434 (1878); Wills v. Reed, 5 Cinn.
L. Bull. 79 (188o); Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 19 Weekly
L. Bull. 292 (Cinn. 0. Super. Ct. 1888); Merchants'
National Bank v. Overman Carriage Co., 17 Ohio Cir. 253
(1898). But Morgan v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St. I, 6 (1888)
(see under V) seems to go far toward assimilating the doc-
trine as recognized in Ohio with the doctrine generally pre-
vailing in this country.
The general doctrine that such a purchase is illegal in the
absence of statutory authority, was also more or less dis-
tinctly recognized in German Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler,
19 Kan. 6o (1877); see also Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan.
405 (1879); St. Louis Manuf. Co. v. Hilbert, 24 Mo. App.
338 (I8g ).
The question of the legality of such a purchase in the
absence of statutory authority, was regarded as unnecessary
to be decided, in Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., 64
Minn. 307 (1896); Jefferson v. Burford, 17 S. W. Rep.
855 (Ky. Ct. App. 1891); Herring v. Ruskin Coop. Assoc.
52 S. W. Rep. 327 (Tenn. Ch. L. App. 1899); Chapman v.
Ironclad Rheostat Co., 62 N. J. Law, 497 (1898) ; Miller v.
Washington Southern Ry. Co., ii Wash. 414 (1895). See
Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 14o, 146 (1883); Cartwright
v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476, 485 (189o); Coleman v.
Columbia Oil Co., 51 Pa. St. 74 (1865); Matter of Reci-
procity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9, 18 (186o); U. S. Trust Co. v.
Harris, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 75, 90 (1857) ; Bank of San Luis
Obispo v. Wickersham, 99 Cal. 655 (1893); Woodroof v.
Howes, 88 Cal. 184, 198 (1891); Calteaux v. Miller, lO2
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Wis. 525 (1899) ; Solomon Salt Co. v. Barber, 58 Kan. 419
(1897); Browne v. St. Paul Plow Works, 62 Minn. 9o
(1895); Yeaton v. Eagle Oil & Refining Co., 4 Wash. 183
(1892).
The special grounds of the general doctrine that such a
purchase is inherently illegal will now be considered under
Points II and III.
II.
ILLEGALITY OF PURCHASE AS CONSTITUTING TRANSACTION
STRICTLY ULTRA VIRES, THAT IS, BEYOND AUTH-
ORIZED PURPOSES OF CORPORATION.
In Trevor v. Whitworth (see under I) the purchase was
regarded as illegal, whether or not it operated as a cancella-
tion or extinguishment of the stock, that is to say, if it
operated as a cancellation or extinguishment, it was an
unauthorized reduction of the capital, while, if it did not so
operate, it was "a trafficking in shares," and hence a transac-
tion beyond the authorized purposes of the corporation (pp.
419, 4.25). See also Hope v. International Financial Soc.,
4 L. R. Ch. Div. 327, 335 (1876). Under this point we
consider the latter alternative only, reserving the other for
consideration under III.
This conclusion was reached by applying the broad doc-
trine declared in the leading decision of Ashbury Railway,
etc., Co. v. Riche, 7 L. R. House of Lords 653 (1875) that
"a company cannot employ its funds for the purpose of any
transactions which do not come within the objects specified
in the memorandum." See also Zuheta's Claim, 5 L. R.
Ch. App. 444 (1870). The court in Trevor v. Whitworth
applied on this point the following language of Brett, J., in
Hope v. International Financial Society, 4 L. R. Ch. Div.
327, 339 (1876).
"It is said that a selling of shares is not of itself a traffick-
ing in shares. Well, that may be quite true. If I make a
present of a horse I cannot be said to be dealing in horses;
but I apprehend if I buy a horse for the purpose of selling
it again, I do deal in a horse. So here, if you take that to be
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the reasonable meaning of the resolution, then the resolu-
tion is this, that the company are to buy the shares for the
purpose of reiss4ing them, that is, for the purpose of selling
them again. They do not say so in terms, but that is the
necessary effect of what they intend to do by the resolution.
That seems to be a trafficking in shares, and a carrying on
of the business which is not within the terms of the memo-
randum of association. It is true that that may not be a
continuing business, but no more was that which was done
in the case of The Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Com-
pany v. Riche. That was only to be one transaction, but
because the transaction was a business transaction not con-
templated or mentioned in the memorandum of association
it was not allowed."
In another opinion in Trevor v. Whitworth however, the
purchase was characterized (p. 430) as
.9fnot an isolated transaction, with a single troublesome
shareholder who was obstructing the business of the com-
pany, but part and parcel of a scheme carried out by the
directors under the articles of association, by which they
acquired for the company more than one-fourth of the whole
shares of its undertaking, and returned to the shareholders
from whom they purchased, more than one-fourth of its
paid lp capital."
For other English decisions more or less closely in point,
see Daniell's Case, 2:2 Beav, 43 (1856); Munt's Case, 22
Beav. 55 (1856). Compare Ex parte Credit Foncier, etc,,
7 L. R. Ch. App. 161 (187); Re Clayton Mills Manuf. Co.,
37 L. R. Ch. Div. 28 (1887) ; Hodgkinson v. National Live
Stock Ins. Co., 26 Beav. 473 (1859) ; Evans v. Coventry,
25 L. J. Ch. 489 (1856); s. c. on appeal 8 DeGex, M. & G.
835 (1857).
There has been comparatively little tendency in this coun-
try to base the illegality of the purchase on the ground that it
is beyond the authorized purposes of the corporation, instead
of on special circumstances of injury, though in Coppin v.
Greenlees & Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St. 275 (1882), for
instance, cases denying the power were said to rest upon
"the foundation principle that a corporation possesses no
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powers except such as are conferred upon it by its charter,
either by express grant or necessary implication."
But this application of the doctrine of ultra vires may on
principle be open to criticism, as confounding the distinc-
tion between what is strictly an ultra vires act, and what
may be termed a wrongful act ultra vires. This distinction
may be illustrated by comparing the case of the purchase by
a banking corporation, of a building suitable only for manu-
facturing purposes, with the case of the purchase by such a
corporation of a building suitable indeed for banking pur-
poses only, but at an enormously extravagant price. If
under any conditions the purchase in the latter case consti-
tutes a legal wrong, the illegality rests on a different ground
from the illegality of the purchase in the former case. For
the purchase of a building suitable only for manufacturing
purposes, is inherently outside the authorized purposes of a
banking corporation, that is, strictly ultra vires, while the
purchase of a building suitable only for banking purposes,
is inherently within the authorized purposes of such a cor-
poration, that is, infra vires, the legal wrong of such a pur-
chase, if any there be, resting on special circumstances of
injury accompanying such ultra vires act. The purchase by
a corporation of its own stock, if or whenever wrongful,
seems to me (so far at least as concerns any injury to the
corporation or continuing stockholders) to be analogous to
the case supposed, of a purchase of a building for banking,
rather than of one for manufacturing purposes.
Of course the objection here considered is obviated by
express statutory authority for the purchase. And in some
instances, where the statutory authority is less obvious, such
purchases have been .sustained. Thus in Robison v. Beall,
26 Ga. 17, 28 (1858) where reference was made to a statute
conferring power to purchase and sell every kind of "goods,
chattels and effects." So in Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49
Iowa, 25 (1878) of a statute conferring power to acquire
"any property that may be deemed desirable in the transac-
tion of its business." So in Rollins v. Shaver Wagon, etc.,
Co., So Iowa 380 (1890) of power "to acquire any property,
real and personal." See also Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank
v. Champlain Transp. Co., 18 Vt. 131, 139 (1846); Shoe-
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maker v. Washburn Lumber Co., 97 Wis. 585, 594 (1897).
Compare Singers' Case, 4 Weekly Notes, 206 (i869);
Cockburn's Case, 4 DeGex & Sm. 177 (185o).
On the other hand in Coppin v. Greenlees & Ransom Co.,
38 Ohio St. 275 (1882) authority to so purchase was held
not conferred on a corporation by a statute empowering it
"to acquire and convey at pleasure all such real and personal
estate as may be necessary or convenient to carry into effect
the objects of the corporation." And in Barton v. Port
Jackson, etc., Plank Road Co., 17 Barb. 397, 407 (1854)
not on a plank road corporation by a statute empowering it
"to hold, purchase and convey, such real and personal estate
as the purposes of the corporation shall require, not exceed-
ing the amount limited in their charier."
In some cases the illegality of the purchase has been based
on statutory prohibitions. Thus in German Savings Bank
v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 6o (1877) of a provision that
no such corporation should "employ its stock, means, assets
or other property, directly or indirectly, for any other pur-
pose whatever, than to accomplish the legitimate objects of
its creation."
III.
ILLEGALITY OF PURCHASE AS CONSTITUTING UNAUTHOR-
IZED REDUCTION OF CAPITAL.
As already stated, there has been comparatively little
tendency in this country to base the illegality of such a pur-
chase on the ground that it is beyond the authorized pur-
poses of the corporation; rather it has been based on the
existence of special circumstances of injury. But we are
now confronted with the additional objection that the pur-
chase is illegal as constituting an unauthorized reduction of
the capital.
Does such a purchase constitute a reduction of capital?
To the extent that the selling stockholder receives compen-
sation for his stock, the conclusion seems inevitable that it
does. As already pointed out, it may well be that the pro-
portionate share of each continuing stockholder is increased,
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but this does not prevent the property of the corporation as
a whole from being reduced. It is no answer to say that
the stock remains uncancelled and unextinguished in the
hands of the corporation, and may be reissued. This means
no more than that at some future time some person may be
found ready and willing to replace the property removed by
the selling stockholder. In the meantime, however, there
is an unqualified reduction of the capital, that is, of the prop-
erty of the corporation as a whole. See 1 "Morawetz on
Corporations," 2d ed., §§ 112, 114.
Although, as we shall presently see, the weight of Ameri-
can authority is overwhelmingly to the contrary, in a few
instances there has been what I regard as a correct appre-
hension of the legal effect of the purchase. Thus in Tulare
Irrigation District v. Kawehah Canal, etc., Co., 44 Pac. Rep.
662 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1896) where a contract by a corpora-
tion to convey all its personal property was held to not
include its own stock that it had purchased, it was said:
"Whether the defendant (corporation) had power to per-
manently reduce its stock or not, the effect of the purchase
was to reduce its stock temporarily and until it should be
regularly reissued. So long as it remains in the treasury, it
represents no part of or interest in the property of the cor-
poration. It was as though it had never been issued." So
in Belknap v. Adams, 49 La. Ann. 1350 (r897) it was held
that the stock was in such a case "by the purchase cancelled,
and remained cancelled for all purposes until reissued," the
court saying: "The purchase is an unauthorized use of the
corporate funds, but when permitted to stand or is unas-
sailed, the purchase simply extinguishes the stock and
increases the rights of the remaining stockholders." And
Shoemaker v. Washburn Lumber Co., 97 Wis. 585, 589,
591 (1897) may be authority for the position that the pur-
chase operates as a reduction. In England, it seems estab-
lished that the purchase constitutes a reduction of capital.
Thus in Re Sovereign Life Assurance Co., 3 L. R. Ch. Div.
(1892) 279, 288 (Lindley, J.) it was held that "a reduction
of capital is a necessary consequence of a statutory power
enabling a company to invest its assets in the purchase of its
own shares," and see Trevor v. Whitworth, infra.
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Is such reduction of the capital illegal as an unauthorized
corporate act? In the light of the softened conceptions of
the limits of corporate power, adapted to the needs of
modern business corporations, there would seem to be much
plausibility in the contention that, even in the absence of
statutory authority, there is no legal objection to the increase
of the capital of a corporation to the limit of its needs.
Mediaeval conceptions have however established a contrary
doctrine, so that a discussion of the point seems purely aca-
demic. But, allowing that broad considerations of public
policy forbid the increase of the capital of a corporation, in
the absence of statutory authority, there would seem to
remain plausibility in the contention that such considerations
are inapplicable to a mere reduction. Here, again however
a contrary doctrine has been so firmly established, that a dis-
cussion of the point is probably purely academic. See 2
"Thompson on Corporations," §2o79. In this view a pur-
chase by a corporation of its own stock is inherently illegal,
as constituting an unauthorized reduction of the capital.
This is the doctrine apparently sanctioned by the English
House of Lords in Trevor v. Whitworth, though to some
extent the decision on this point was based on the existence
of special statutory provisions. Here it was said (p. 415) :
"By the Act of 1867 provision was made enabling a com-
pany under strictly defined conditions to reduce its capital.
Nothing can be stronger than these carefully worded pro-
visions to show how inconsistent with the very constitu-
tion of a joint stock company, with limited liability, the
right to reduce its capital was considered to be ....
The stringent precautions to prevent the reduction of the
capital of a limited company, without due notice and judi-
cial sanction, would be idle if the company might purchase
its own shares wholesale, and so effect the desired result."
So in another opinion it was said (p. 437): "When Par-
liament sanctions the doing of a thing under certain condi-
tions and with certain restrictions, it must be taken that the
thing is prohibited unless the prescribed conditions and
restrictions are observed . . Payment of capital to
any one shareholder is just as much a reduction of capital,
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and just as detrimental to the interests of creditors, as the
payment of the same amount among all the shareholders
ratably."
Moreover some stress was laid on proviisions that the
memorandum of association should state the amount of
capital, and that, save as prescribed therein, "no alteration
should be made in the conditions contained in" such memo-
randum, these provisions being interpreted (p. 415) as
"assuring to those dealing with the company that the whole
of the subscribed capital, unless diminished by expenditure
upon the objects defined by the memorandum, shall remain
available for the discharge of its liabilities." See also pp.
423, 433; Hope v. International Financial Soc., 4 L. R.
Ch. Div. 327, 336 (1876) ; St. Louis Manuf. Co. v. Hilbert,
24 Mo. App. 338 (1887).
The American decisions have as a rule avoided the con-
clusion that the purchase constitutes a reduction of the
capital, and hold on the contrary that the stock continues to
be held by the corporation uncancelled and unextinguished,
so that it may be reissued. The illogical character of this
doctrine I have already endeavored to point out. Such
decisions are Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass.
37 (1873) ; Commonwealth v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co.,
142 Mass. 146 (1886); Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542,
551 (1869) ; City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507
(1858) ; Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881) ; Williams
v. Savage Manuf. Co., 3 Md. Ch. 418, 452 (851) ; Morgan
v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St. 1, 7 (1888); Rivanna Navigation Co.
v. Dawsons, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 19, 24 (1846); Hartridge v.
Rockwell, R. M. Charlton (Ga.) 260 (1828); Robison v.
Beall, 26 Ga. 17, 28 (1858); State Bank of Ohio v. Fox,
3 Blatchf. 431 (1856) ; State, ex rel. Page v. Smith, 48 Vt.
266, 285 (1876); Eggmann v. Blanke, 40 Mo. App. 318
(189 o ) ; St. Louis Rawhide Co. v. Hill, 72 Mo. App. 142,
148 (1897) ; Jefferson v. Burford, 17 S. W. Rep. 855 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1891) ; Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563 (1896). See
also Commissioners of Johnson County v. Thayer, 94 U. S.
631, 643 (Oct., 1876); Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co.,
86 Ill. 220, 224 (1877); Howe Grain & Mercantile Co. v.
lones, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 198 (1899); Matter of Reciproc-
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ity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9, 17 (186o); Bank of San Luis Obispo
v. Wickersham, 99 Cal. 655, 661 (1893); Ralston v. Bank
of California, 112 Cal. 208 (1896). Compare as to scrip
certificates Rogers v. Phelps, 31 N. Y. State Rep. 872, 876
(Sup. Ct., Gen. T., Ist Dept., 189o). In some decisions it
has been intimated that the question whether the purchase
operates as a reduction is one of intent on the part of the
corporation. See City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, supra;
State, ex rel. Page v. Smith, supra.
The precise status of the stock during this period of sus-
pended animation, between the time of purchase and that
of reissue, seems not to have been fully determined. That
it cannot be voted upon, see Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cowen, 426,
434 (1826); American Railway-Frog Co. v. Havens, IOI
Mass. 398, 402 (1869); Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15,
27 (1869); Monsseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Ann. 482
(1867); see also Farwell v. Houghton Copper Works, 8
Fed. Rep. 66 (Cir. Ct. Mich. 1881); U. S. v. Columbian
Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. 1484o; Allen v. DeLagerberger, 20
Weekly L. Bull. 368 (Cinn. Ohio Super. Ct. 1888); Vail
v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881).
The decisions that the purchase does not constitute a
reduction of capital, avoid the difficulty presented in the
question, whether such reduction must not be equal or pro-
portionate as among all the stockholders, in other words,
whether a purchase from one stockholder, to the exclusion of
the others, does not constitute an illegal discrimnination
against them. Thus in Currier v. Lebanon Slate Co., 56 N.
H. 262, 270 (1875) a statutory provision for reducing the
capital stock of a corporation, was held not to authorize a
purchase by the corporation of its own stock from a stock-
holder holding only a portion of the entire stock. The
court said:
"The statute ought not to be construed to work other than
exact and even justice to all the shareowners . . . I do
not think a corporation has the power (under the statute)
to diminish its capital stock by the purchase and extinguish-
ment of a portion of its shares without the consent and
against the protest of any of its stockholders when such
purchase and extinguishment would operate for the relief
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and benefit of the stockholders from whom the stock is pur-
chased, and 'Will increase the liability of the remaining
stockholders . . . Probably a vote allowing each
stockholder to surrender such proportion of the shares
owned by him as the amount of the proposed reduction in
the capital stock bears to the whole amount of capital stock,
would not be open to objection, but would be a compliance
with the requirements of the statute ;-but that was hot the
course pursued here."
But under a statutory provision for reducing the stock
of a corporation, a scheme involving a purchase of the stock
of a portion of the stockholders was sanctioned in British &
American Trustee, etc., Co. v. Couper, L. R. App. Cas.
(1894) 399.
IV.
PURCHASE AS LEGAL IN THE ABSENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
PRODUCING SPECIAL INJURY.
As we have seen, the doctrine seems established in Eng-
land that such a purchase is inherently illegal, either on the
ground that it constitutes a transaction beyond the author-
ized purposes of the corporation, or on the ground that it
constitutes an unauthorized reduction of capital. As we
have also seen, neither of these grounds is regarded by the
American decisions generally as a sufficient basis of the
illegality of the purchase. On the contrary, the prevailing
American doctrine seems to be that the purchase is legal in
the absence of circumstances producing special injury to
other stockholders or to creditors.
Very suggestive in this connection is State v. Minnesota
Thresher Manuf. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 227 (1889), where a
quo warranto proceeding was held not a proper remedy
against such a purchase, the court saying:
"If it is a wrong to other stockholders, they have a per-
fect remedy; and, so far as creditors are concerned, if the
act is illegal, the parties who surrendered the stock would
still be personally responsible as stockholders in case of the
insolvency of the corporation."
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In Chicago, Pekin & Southwestern R, R. Co. v. Town
of Marseilles, 84 Ill. 145, 643 (1876-77), where an agree-
ment by a corporation for the purchase of its own stock was
held enforcible, the court said, after a citation of cases (p.
645) :
"These authorities, we think, fully recognize the power
of the directors of a company, when not prohibited by thei
charter, to purchase shares of stock of their company. It
falls within the scope of the poiver of the directors to manage
and control the affairs and property of the company for the
best interests of the stockholders, and when they have thus
acted, we will presume, until the contrary is shown, that the
purchase was for legitimate and authorized purposes.
"If it were shown that the purchase was made to pro-
mote the interests of the officers of the company alone, and
not the stockholders generally, or if for the benefit of a por-
tion of the stockholders and not all, or for the injury of all
or only a portion of them, or if it operated to the injury of
creditors, or would defeat the end for which the body was
created, or if it was done for any other fraudulent purpose,
then chancery could interfere."
See also Havemayer v. Bordeaux Co., 8 Nat. Corp. Rep.
127 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill., 1894) ,
So in First National Bank of Salem v. Salem Capital
Flour Mills Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 89 (Cir. Ct. Oreg., 1889),
such an agreement was held enforcible, the purchase being
for an amount above par and with intent to reissue the stock.
At the time of the purchase the corporation appeared to be
solvent, and was much more than able to pay its debts. It
had only one creditor and the purchase did not injuriously
affect the interest of such creditor, nor was it so intended.
As the court said (p. 96) :
"It was made in good faith, to acquire the control of a
valuable property free from the dissensions arising from the
personal distrusts and antipathies of a dissatisfied faction of
the stockholders."
The court added:
"Neither in my judgment is a purchase of stock by a cor-
poration, even when made under circumstances or for pur-
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poses that make it voidable, generally and absolutely void,
but only as against those who are injured by it, and in some
proper and timely proceeding seek redress against it."
So in Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37
(1873), relief was denied a stockholder against such an
agreement for purchase at a price not exceeding the extrinsic
value of the stock as based on a "reasonable estimate of" the
corporate property. See also Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass.
542, 551 (1869).
In Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., i Edw. Ch. 84, 94
(1831), in a stockholder's suit, relief was denied against
such a purchase, which was claimed to be a fraud against the
other stockholders. The court said:
"I can easily imagine how it may be so in some instances,
and why it may prove injurious to the interests of the latter.
But there is no evidence before me of any such design; and
it is not very apparent how the purchase of the shares of its
own stock has been detrimental to the interests of the stock-
holders. And even if it were proved, the remedy, I think,
is not against the company in its corporate capacity, but
against the directors by whom the fraud may have been com-
mitted or through whose management the loss has been
sustained. The statute makes them personally accountable;
and, therefore, the application to this court must be made
in a different form."
And the following are decisions in which such a purchase
was sustained, and, so far as appears, on the general ground
just indicated: Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881);
Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlton (Ga.) 260 (1828);
Robison v. Beall, 26 Ga. 17, 28 (1858); Commissioners of
Johnson County v. Thaye'r, 94 U. S. 631, 643 (Oct., 1876) ;
Blalock v. Kernersville Manuf. Co., iio N. C. 99 (1892);
Howe Grain & Mercantile Co. v. Jones, 21 Tex. Civ. App.
198 (1899); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass.
148 (1894) ; EggnMann v. Blanke, 4o Mo. App. 318 (189o;
so held as a matter of Illinois law).
Even in England, where, as we have seen, so strict a rule
has been established against the legality of such a purchase,
a forfeiture or surrender has been regarded as unobjection-
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able. Thus, in Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 L. R. App. Cas.
409, 417 (1887), the case of a forfeiture or surrender was
distinguished as "not involving any payment out of the
funds of the company." See also pp. 424, 438. As to gift
to corporation, see Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Drexel, 90
N. Y. 87, 93 (1882); as to bequests, Rivanna Navigation
Co. v. Dawsons, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 19, 24 (1846).
V.
PURCHASE AS LEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES PRO-
DUCING SPECIAL BENEFIT.
If, as apparently held in the decisions just considered, it
be sound doctrine that the purchase is legal in the absence of
circumstances producing special injury, it is not strictly
necessary to consider in such a case whether there exist any
circumstances producing special benefit. Nevertheless, in
some instances the courts have been apparently unwilling to
base the legality of the purchase solely on the negative
ground of absence of injury, and have more or less distinctly
based it on the presence of benefit.
Conspicuous illustrations are cases of stock received in
payment of an existing debt. Thus in Taylor v. Miami Ex-
porting Co., 6 Ohio 176, 219 (1833) ; City Bank of Colum-
bus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507 (1858); State Bank of Ohio v.
Fox, 3 Blatchf. 431 (1856); Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563
(1896); Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 167 Pa. St.
370, 377 (1895). See also Ralston v. Bank of California,
112 Cal. 208, 213 (1896).
A wide scope was allowed to what we may here call the
doctrine of special benefit, in Morgan v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St.
I, 6 (I888), where, the legality of the purchase being in
dispute, it was held error to exclude evidence tending to
show that the transaction was for the purpose of taking
back from the corporation property for which the stock
had been issued, and the possession of which property by the
;corporation promised to result in a disappointing and
unsatisfactory venture, and was rapidly breeding discord
among the stockholders. The court, while recognizing as
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well established the general doctrine that a corporation
cannot purchase its own stock, also recognized as an excep-
tion its power to take such stock in satisfaction of a debt,
and said:
"This has been recognized as an exception supposed to
rest upon the necessity of avoiding loss. . . . If the
same or a like necessity of avoiding loss should arise in any
of the transactions of the company, it could not, with any
show of reason, be contended that the application of this
principle of necessity should be limited by any iron rule to
the case of taking stock for an otherwise hopeless debt."
Compare Cincinnati, Hamilton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Duck-
worth, 2 Ohio Cir. 58, 536 (1887); State v. Franklin
Bank, io Ohio 91, 97 (184o). In St. Louis Rawhide Co.
v. Hill, 72 Mo. App. 142, 148 (1897), where a contract by
a corporation to sell its own stock that it had purchased, was
held enforcible, the court said:
"The transaction in this case was to acquire by the cor-
poration eighty shares of its stock in consideration of its
surrender of an overdue note for $iooo, and to resell these
certificates for $200o cash. The transaction, had it been
carried out, would have benefited both the corporation and
its creditors, and must be held to come within the exception
of the rule that a corporation cannot buy and sell its own
certificates of stock."
Compare as to surrender of stock subscribed for, Cooper
v. Frederick, 9 Ala. 738 (1846).
In England a tendency had been manifested to give effect
to this doctrine of special benefit. Thus in Re' Dronfield
Silkstone Coal Co., 17 L. R. Ch. Div. 76 (188o), reluctantly
followed in We'ekes' Case, 17 L. R. (Ireland) 239 (1886).
But such tendency received a decided check in Trevor v.
FThitworth, supra, where see extended comments on Re
Dronfield Silkstone Coal Co. Perhaps the same tendency
was manifested in Re Denver Hotel Co., I L. R. Ch. Div.
(1893) 495, where, a corporation having power under its
articles to "accept a surrender of a share or shares," while
forbidden to expend its funds in the purchase of its shares.
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an agreement by which it was to transfer certain property,
the possession of which was disadvantageous to it, and
receive its own shares, was sustained, as a surrender, how-
ever, not as a purchase. See however comments on this
decision in British & American Trustee, etc., Co. v. Couper,
I L. R. App. Cas. (1894) 399, 410, 414.
VI.
PURCHASE AS ILLEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES PRO-
DUCING SPECIAL INJURY TO THE CORPORATION OR
CONTINUING STOCKHOLDERS.
We now come to a class of cases as to which there is agree-
ment among the decisions, that is, as to the result, though
not as to the grounds, of the decision. For it seems uni-
versally agreed that the purchase is illegal if accompanied
with sufficient circumstances of special injury, whether to
the corporation or the continuing stockholders, or to credi-
tors. It will, of course, be understood that in one class of
decisions the illegality is regarded as inherent in the pur-
chase, while in the other it is based on the special circum-
stances of injury. It is only the latter class that we shall
here consider.
Althoughthe illegalityis more frequently based on circum-
stances of special injury to creditors, rather than to the cor-
poration or continuing stockholders, yet some cases are
properly referable to the latter class. It is these alone that
we shall here consider, reserving cases of injury to creditors
for consideration under VII.
A good illustration is furnished by Lowe v. Pioneer
Threshing Co., 7o Fed. Rep. 646 (Cir. Ct. Minn., 1895).
Here it was clearly recognized that "in the absence of a
charter prohibition or a statute forbidding it, there is no
reason why the stock should not be purchased, at least with
the profits derived from the business of the corporation,
where all the stockholders assent therto." Yet the pur-
chase there under consideration was held void as in fraud of
the rights of minority stockholders, as such purchase was
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to be made by a transfer of nearly all the assets and property
of the corporation to a few favored stockholders.
So in Price v. Pine Mountain Iron & Coal Co., 32 S. W.
Rep. 267 (Ky. Ct. App., 1895) the purchase there under
Consideration was considered as "disastrous to the last
degree to the main body of the stockholders," the court
saying:
"Corporations ought not to be allowed to speculate in
their own stocks; and while they may not always do an
illegal thing in buying in their own stock, such a transaction
must be not only in entire good faith, but the exchange must
be of equal value, and the transaction free from all fraud,
actual or constructive. . . . The contract ought not to
be to the advantage of a few favored stockholders, to the
injury of the great body of them."
So in Currier v. Lebanon Slate Co., 56 N. H. 262 (1875),
in a stockholder's suit, relief was granted against a purchase
from a stockholder who had been unable to pay the assess-
ments thereon in full. The ground of the decision seems
to have been that assets of the corporation were diverted to
pay for stock of little or no value. The court said (p. 268) :
"I am not prepared to say that under the laws of this state
a solvent corporation may not, in good faith, and for the
purpose of securing payment of a debt against a stockholder,
which might not otherwise be collected without risk, delay,
and expense, receive its own stock in payment therefor at
its fair value, and hold the same as property; in which case
it would not become extinguished, and might be reissued
to the purchaser thereof. But this case differs widely from
such a case. The object of the vote in question appears to
have been, or was declared to be, not to collect a debt due to
the corporation, but to afford relief to a stockholder by tak-
ing off his hands stock for which he had partially paid, but
for which he was unable to complete the payments. This
was done by hiring money for the purpose, or rather by
giving him the notes of the corporation to be negotiated by
him, and ultimately paid by the company, and against the
protest of the plaintiff. It is difficult to see how the welfare
of the corporation could be promoted by hiring money, or
incurring further liabilities, to purchase in one-tenth of its
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capital stock, for which there had been no sale in the open
market, and upon which no dividend had ever been declared,
and for which it was extremely doubtful whether another
purchaser could be found, unless the affairs of the company
should improve (a condition which appearances then hardly
warranted). The inevitable result was to release Liscomb
from paying into the treasury of the company the balance of
the assessments then made, or to which the stock was liable,
amounting to $8,ooo."
"The action of the company relieved Mr. 'Liscomb from
his contract to pay the overdue assessments upon one hun-
dred shares of stock, but it involved the company in a
further debt of $2,000 for one hundred shares of stock for
which the company had no use, and which it is fair to pre-
sume others would have bought if they had possessed any
value. The assets of the company were thus withdrawn,
and appropriated to an unlawful purpose, and at the same
time the indebtedness of the company was increased."
See also as to illegality of purchase as producing special
injury to the corporation or continuing stockholders. Re
Republic Ius. Co,, 3 Bissell, 452, 458 (t873)) Augsburg
Land, etc., Co. v. POpper, 95 Va. 92 (1897).
VII.
PURCHASE AS ILLEGAL IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES PRO-
DUCING SPECIAL INJURY TO EXISTING CREDI-
TORS OF THE CORPORATION.
It is the generally accepted doctrine in this country that
the "capital stock of an insolvent corporation is a trust
fund for the payment of its debts," to use the language of,
for instance, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, 427 (1891).
If there be any doubt as to the propriety of extending this
doctrine to unpaid subscriptions for stock, there would
seem to be none as to tangible assets. Purchase by an insol-
vent corporation of its own stock necessarily involves the
diversion of its assets from its creditors, to the extent that
such assets constitute a consideration for the purchase. This
is regarded as a legal injury to such creditors, that is to say,
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creditors who are such at the time of the purchase, as dis-
tinguished from those subsequently becoming such. As to
this distinction see Shoemaker v. Washburn Lumber Co.,
97 Wis. 585, 592 (1897); Rollins v. Shaver Wagon, etc.,
Co., 8o Iowa, 380 (189o); Cooper v. Frederick, 9 Ala. 738
(1846); Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150,
163 (189o). Nor will such relief be granted where the cor-
poration was solvent at the time of the purchase, especially
if the conditions of the purchase were fair and free from
fraud. See Fraser v. Ritchie, 8 Ill. App. 554 (1881), and
compare Moon Bros. Co. v. Waxahachie Co., 13 Tex. Civ.
App. 103, 107 (1896); Howe Grain & Mercantile Co. v.
Jones, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 198 (1899).
Subject, however, to these qualifications, relief has in
numerous instances been granted to creditors of a corpora-
tion against such a purchase. Thus they have been allowed
to subject to their claims the property transferred for the
stock, as in Clapp v. Peterson, 1O4 Ill. 26 (1882; where, how-
ever, there was no proof of the condition of the corporation
at the time of the exchange) ; Commercial National Bank v.
Burch, 141 Ill. 519 (1892); Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn.
73, IOO (1884) ; Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29 (1896). Simi-
larly, claims for the price of the purchased stock have not
been allowed to be enforced to the prejudice of creditors.
Columbian Bank's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 422, 436; Hamor
v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed. Rep. 392 (Cir.
Ct. Del., 1897). See also Adams & Westlake Co. v. Dey-
ette, 8 S. D. 119 (1895). So, one selling or surrendering
his stock has been held to continue to be a stockholder, for
the purpose of enforcing his liability as such to creditors.
Gill v. Balis, 72 Mo. 424 (188o). Compare, however,Repub-
lic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135, III. 150, 162 (189o);
Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 220 (1877).
See also as to granting relief to creditors, Roan v. Winn.
93 Mo. 503 (1887); Heggie v. Building & Loan 'Assoc.,
107 N. C. 581, 595 (189o); Bridgens v. Dollar Savings
Bank, 66 Fed. Rep. 9 (Cir. Ct. Mo., 1895) ; Farnsworth v.
Robbins, 36 Minn. 369 (1887) ; Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo.
495 (1881); Butler Paper Co. v. Robbins, 151 Ill. 588
(1894) ; Bent v. Hart, io Mo. App. 143, 147 (1881).
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In some instances the purchase has been characterized
as producing injury to creditors, without reference to the
condition of the corporation as solvent or insolvent, and
in the absence of objection made by any creditor. Such an
instance is Coppin v. Greenlees & Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St.
275 (1882), where, though as already stated, the illegality
of the purchase was based on inherent want of power, and
though, so far as appears, there was no evidence as to the
financialcondition of the corporation, and although no objec-
tion to the purchase was made on behalf of any creditor,
reference was, unnecessarily as it would seem, made to the
following provision of the Ohio constitution: "Dues from
corporations shall be secured by such individual liability of
stockholders, and other means, as may be prescribed by
law; but, in all cases, each stockholder shall be liable, over
and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount
unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to
such stock," The court said:
"The corporation itself cannot be a stockholder of its
own stock within the meaning of this provision of the con-
stituti6n. Nobody will deny this proposition. And if a
corporation can buy one share of its stock at pleasure, why
may it not buy every share? If the right of a corporation
to purchase its own stock at pleasure, exists and is unlimited,
where is the provision intended for the benefit of creditors?
This is not the security to which the constitution invites the
creditors of corporations. I am aware that the amount of
stock required to be issued is not fixed by the constitution
or by statute, and also that provision is made by statute for
the reduction of the capital stock of corporations; but of
these matters, creditors are bound to take notice. They
have a right, however, to assume that stock once issued, and
not called back in the manner provided by law, remains out-
standing in the hands of stockholders, liable to respond to
creditors to the extent of the individual liability prescribed.
In this view it matters not whether the stock purchased by
the corporation that issued it, becomes extinct, or is held
subject to be re-issued. It is enough to know that the cor-
poration, as purchaser of its own stock, does not afford to
creditors the security intended. And surely, if the law
forbids the organization of a corporation without stock,
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because the required security is not furnished, it cannot be
that, having brought the corporation into existence, it invests
it with power to assume at pleasure the identical character
or relation to the public, that was an insurmountable objec-
tion to the giving of corporate existence in the first place."
Similar views were expressed as to the effect of a like
constitutional provision in German Savings Bank v. Wulfe-
kuhler, 19 Kan. 61 (1877), where no objection to the pur-
chase was made on behalf of any creditor, though the cor-
poration was at the time of the purchase in an "embarrassed
condition." See also St. Louis Manuf. Co. v. Hilbert, 24
Mo. App. 338 (1887). Compare Vercoutere v. Golden
State Land Co., ix6 Cal. 410 (1897).
VIII.
LEGALITY OF PURCHASE As AFFECTED BY CHARACTER OF
CORPORATION.
There appears to be no distinction affecting the power of
purchase, based on the character of the corporation. Thus
railroad, as well as trading and manufacturing corporations
generally, have been held to possess such power. In Chicago,
Pekin & Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Town of Marseilles,
84 Ill. 643 (1877), where an agreement by a railroad cor-
poration to purchase its own stock was upheld, the court
said, after citing cases:
"If, then, as in the cases above referred to, a bank may
purchase and hold its own shares, no reason is perceived
why a railroad corporation may not do the same thing, and
the case of The State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 was the purchase
of stock by the railroad company, and of shares of its own
stock."
And such a purchase by a railroad corporation was
sustained in Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542, 551 (1888) ;
the case of The State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 was the purchase
643 (Oct., 1876) ; State, ex rel. Page v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266,
285 (1876).
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Ix.
RIGHT TO RELIEF AGAINST PURCHASE AS AFFECTED BY
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXECUTORY AND
EXECUTED TRANSACTION.
In some instances relief has been allowed against a pur-
chase, though the transaction has been completed by transfer
of both the stock and the consideration therefor. Thus in
St. Louis Manuf. Co. v. Hilbert, 24 Mo. App. 338 (1887)
a corporation was held entitled to recover back property sold,
for which its own stock had been received in payment. Com-
pare as to the conditions of allowing the corporation relief
against such a transaction, Bank of San Luis Obispo v.
Wickersham, 99 Cal. 655 (1893). See also under VII as
to relief allowed creditors.
But in some decisions is manifest a tendency to establish
a distinction between an executory and an executed transac-
tion, with reference to the allowance of relief. Thus in
Morgan v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St. I, 7 (1888) where the pur-
chase was sustained, the court said:
"We should not lose sight of the fact that there was an
executed transaction. The exchange-or the re-exchange,
rather-had been made, possession of the furnace taken
Morgan, and retained by him for years before the transac-
tion was questioned by any one. To this day it has remained
free from direct attack. Certainly, the possession by
Morgan of this property which had theretofore been in the
possession of the company, was a circumstance proper to be
considered with other facts in the case."
Citing Coppin v. Greenlees & Ransom Co. 38 Ohio St.
275. So in Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 L. R. App. Cas. 409,
42o (x887), where a claim for the purchase price was held
unenforcible. Re Dronield Silkstone Coal Co., 17 L. R.
Ch. Div. 76 (i88o) was distinguished on the ground of the
transaction involved in the case at bar being inchoate. See
also p. 440. See also as to relief against executed contract,
Zuldua's Claim, 5 L. R. Ch. App. 444 (1870).
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X.
SUMMARY.
On the whole, our examination seems to justify the fol-
lowing statement of results:
Two inconsistent doctrines have obtained currency as to
the legality of a purchase by a corporation of its own stock;
one that it is inherently illegal, the other, that it is legal
save under circumstances producing special injury.
The doctrine that it is inherently illegal prevails in Eng-
land, and to a limited extent in this country. It rests on the
ground that such purchase constitutes either a transaction
beyond the authorized purposes of the corporation, or an
unauthorized reduction of capital.
The doctrine that it is legal save under circumstances pro-
ducing special injury to either (I) the corporation or con-
tinuing stockholders, or (2) existing creditors of the cor-
poration, prevails generally in this country.
Frederick H. Clark.
